Volume 3, Number 2—June 1997
Perspective
The Economic Impact of a Bioterrorist Attack: Are Prevention and Postattack Intervention Programs Justifiable?
Table 4
Actuarially fair annual premium ($ millions) |
||||
---|---|---|---|---|
Days post-attackb | Preventable loss ($millions) | 0.01 t0 0.001 | 0.01 to 0.0001 | 0.01 to 0.00001 |
Maximum loss estimatec | ||||
0 | 22,370.5 | 201.3 | 221.5 | 223.5 |
1 | 20,129.4 | 181.2 | 199.3 | 201.1 |
2 | 15,881.5 | 142.9 | 157.2 | 158.7 |
3 | 8,448.0 | 76.0 | 83.6 | 84.4 |
4 | 4,200.1 | 37.8 | 41.6 | 42.0 |
5 | 2,076.1 | 18.7 | 20.6 | 20.7 |
6 | 1,013.8 | 9.1 | 10.0 | 10.1 |
Minimum loss estimated | ||||
0 | 14,372.4 | 128.9 | 141.8 | 143.1 |
1 | 12,820.1 | 115.4 | 126.9 | 128.1 |
2 | 10,049.1 | 90.4 | 99.5 | 100.4 |
3 | 5,200.1 | 46.8 | 51.5 | 51.9 |
4 | 2,429.7 | 21.9 | 24.1 | 24.3 |
5 | 1,004.2 | 9.4 | 10.3 | 10.4 |
6 | 351.2 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 3.5 |
aSee text for definition.
bNo. of days from attack to effective initiation of prophylaxis.
cMaximum loss preventable (potential net savings) occurs with the doxycycline-anthrax vaccine prophylaxis regimen, a multiplication factor of 5 for unnecessary prophylaxis, and a discount rate of 3% (Table 2).
dMinimum loss preventable (potential net savings) occurs with the ciprofloxacin prophylaxis regimen, a multiplication factor of 15 for unnecessary prophylaxis, and a discount rate of 5% (Table 2).
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